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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Appellant by his appeal to this Court seeks a modification 
of a supplemental order modifying decree of divorce and judgment 
entered by the trial court on October 20, 1977, following two 
evidentiary hearings, wherein the trial court awarded to the 
Respondent the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month 
as alimony and the sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) 
per month per child, a total of Seven Hundred Dollars ($700.00) 
per month child support for the support and maintenance of the 
two minor children of the parties. Appellant bases his challenge 
on the proposition that the trial court did not, in fixing these 
amounts, follow the appropriate standards and criteria announced 
by this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks affirmance of the Order and Judgment of 
the trial court and in addition, seeks an award of attorney's 
fees in defense of the appeal and Respondent's costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent agrees with Appellant's statement of facts, 
but submits such statement is not sufficiently detailed to accur-
ately and completely reflect the circumstances of the parties 
upon which the order and judgment of the trial court was made and 
entered, and Respondent therefore sets out her own statement of 
facts for consideration by this Court. 
The parties were married on June 10, 1955 and had three (3) 
children born as the issue of their marriage. Since the commence-
ment of the divorce action below, the eldest of the parties' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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children marriedi leaving the parties' two minor sons remaining, 
The Court awarded the custody of these children to the Respondent, 
During the early years of the parties' marriage, the Appellar,-
secured an education and a degree as a medical doctor. Following 
a period of residency, the Appellant practiced medicine as a 
thoracic surgeon in the State of California and subsequently in 
the State of Utah. 
The Appellant enjoyed a successful medical practice and the 
parties enjoyed a high standard of living up to 1975, when the 
Appellant suffered a disability necessitating a temporary termina· 
tion of his medical practice. During 1975, the Respondent, 
together with her parents, opened a small gift shop business in 
Salt Lake City. Respondent was so employed at the time of the 
divorce in March of 1976. The Respondent provided for the support 
of the family during the Appellant's period of disability from 
her earnings from the business and loans from her parents. 
In the divorce action, the lower court specifically held ~ 
abeyance the matter of alimony and the matter of child support to 
be determined at such time as the Appellant was capable of provid; 
the same and had secured gainful employment. (R. 31 and 38) 
During March of 1976, the Appellant returned to the State of 
California and commenced the practice of medicine there. On 
December 30, 1976, the Respondent filed a petition for modificati: 
of the Decree of Divorce for the purpose of setting and detemi~ 
among other things, alimony to be paid to her and child support 
for the support and maintenance of the parties' minor children. 
The Appellant was served with an order to show cause issued 
-2-
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pursuant thereto in the State of California, but did not appear 
personally at the hearing held thereon on January 14, 1977. At 
the January hearing the trial court heard evidence from the 
Respondent and her accountant concerning the needs of the family, 
the historical earnings of the Appellant and the parties' standard 
of living prior to and following the Appellant's disability and 
the arguments and statements of counsel for both parties. (R. 
53-54) The Court ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent the 
sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month per child, a total 
of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month as child support, at 
the January hearing and continued the matter with respect to 
alimony, additional child support and other matters to a future 
date to be determined by counsel. Apparently, the Appellant 
does not challenge the evidence adduced at that hearing nor the 
matters found and determined by the Court at that hearing. _!I 
Thereafter on May 20, 1977, a further hearing was held with 
respect to Respondent's petition, following which the trial court 
filed a Memorandum Decision on May 23, 1977 (R. 71-72) and there-
after made and entered its Supplemental Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce and Judgment on October 5, 1977 (R. 94-96) from which 
this appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT HAS NOT MET THE BURDEN 
NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD 
A careful review of the Appellant's brief suggests a rehash 
of the same arguments submitted and made to the Trial Court at 
_J/ The transcript of the testimony of the January hearing has not 
been included in the record filed by the Appellant herein. 
-3-
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both evidentiary hearings. 
Although the consideration of alimony and child support is 
regarded as a matter of equity and notwithstanding the power of 
the Supreme Court to review both the law and the facts and to 
make its own findings in connection therewith, this Court has 
repeatedly refused to substitute its judgment for the judgment of 
the Trial Court in matters of this kind. Eastman v. Eastman, SSc 
P. 2d 514 (Utah 1976). Recognizing that the trial judge is obviou; 
in the advantageous position of observing the parties and the 
witnesses and hearing the evidence first hand, this Court has 
previously determined that the actions of the trial Court are 
indulged with a presumption of validity. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). This presumption may only be overturn; 
where an appellant sustains the burden of demonstrating that 
based upon the evidence the decision of the trial court was 
clearly wrong. See, Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977). 
In order to prevail, the Appellant in this case must show 
first, that the evidence clearly preponderates against the finfil~ 
as made by the trial court; second, that there was a misunderstani 
ing or misapplication of law by the trial court resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error to the appellant; or third, 
that a serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 5~ 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). 
Although the Appellant has not specified which of the above· 
listed standards his appeal is based upon, Respondent submits 
-4-
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that Appellant has failed to show the Trial Court's award to be 
deficient under any of such standards. 
A. The evidence presented at the trial clearly supports 
the findings made and entered by the Trial Court. 
1. The Appellant states in his Brief that he disputes the 
findings of the Trial Court regarding his income, and further, 
that he is constrained in his ability to pay Respondent. In 
support of this proposition, Appellant recites on page 8 of his 
brief the effect of applying his overhead expenses as projected 
by Appellant, including the alimony and child support award to 
the Respondent on Appellant's total annual income for the period 
of time from April, 1976 through March, 1977 as found by the 
Trial Court. Appellant concludes that such a projection would 
result in the amount of only $16, 861.00 as income remaining for 
the Appellant. 
Appellant does not state that his actual remaining income is 
$16, 861.00, nor is Appellant requesting a reconsideration of the 
award of alimony due to changed circumstances. Instead, Appellant 
appears to be suggesting that the Trial Court allocated too low a 
figure in estimating Appellant's future overhead expenses. 
Appellant goes on to argue that the Trial Court failed to consider 
Appellant's malpractice insurance premiums in estimating Appellant's 
overhead expenses and under-estimated Appellant's overhead expenses 
by relying on a year when expenses were unusually low (Appellant's 
Brief, pps. 7-9). 
The Appellant is wrong in stating that the Trial Court 
failed to consider the malpractice insurance premiums; he is also 
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wrong in assuming that the Court did not consider the evidence 
presented when determining Appellant's future ability to pay. 
The transcript of the hearing shows that evidence was present 
as to contemplated malpractice in.surance costs, increased overheac 
involved in a contemplated move to a new office and increased 
costs for salary already being paid to Appellant's secretary (~. 
27-29, 38-42, 44-46). This evidence of the projected overhead 
expenses was received and considered by the Trial Court in reaclk 
its subsequent award of alimony and child support. Appellant 
also mischaracterizes the testimony presented when he states that 
the Court relied only on a year when overhead expenses were 
unusually low. Evidence presented at trial included both the 
overhead expenditures for the last eight months of 1976 and the 
first three months of 1977, and the projected expenses for the 
remainder of the year 1977. It should be noted that this period 
of time was the total period for which figures were available, 
i.e. from the beginning of Appellant's practice in California to 
the hearing date. 
Although Appellant states that he disagrees with the findings 
of the Trial Court that his annual taxable income is $66,692.00 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2), Appellant does not specify the basis 
of any such disagreement other than to state that the overhead 
expenses allowed by the Court were unusually low, as discussed 
above. A review of the evidence presented at trial will substan-
tiate the Court's findings that Appellant's income on an accrual 
basis for the nine month period ending December 31, 1976 was 
$62,855.00 and that for the period of January through March of 
-6-
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1977 the Defendant's earnings were $20,576.00 for a total income 
of $83,461.00 before overhead expenses (See Exhibits P-2, P-4, p-
- s and P-6). While the Trial Court used an amount of twenty 
percent (20%)overhead allocation, Appellant's actual overhead 
expense ratio was 15.9% (Tr. 27). 
Appellant argues his inability to provide for Respondent and 
the minor children of these parties at the level ordered by the 
Trial Court but apparently did not feel any financial stress over 
providing adequately for himself. Notwithstanding his claims, he 
was able during his first year of practice to purchase a new 
automobile at a cost of $9,000.00 (Tr. 34-35); accumulate in a 
personal savings account between $3,000.00 and $4,000.00 after 
the payment of taxes (Tr. 34); take a trip to Hawaii at a cost of 
$3,363.00 and attend another convention in San Francisco at a 
cost of $900.00 (Tr. 37), plan to purchase new office furniture 
and equipment for some $15,000.00 (Tr. 46) and move to a new 
office (which Appellant did not anticipate would result in an 
increase of his income) (Tr. 28), all while paying for the support 
of Plaintiff and the minor children of the parties in the calendar 
year 1976 the total sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800. 00) (Tr. 
31). 
Appellant has not shown by his argument that the evidence 
presented clearly preponderates against the findings; he has only 
shown that he disagrees with the result reached by the Trial 
Court, a situation not in and of itself warranting reversal or 
modification of the Trial court's award. 
-7-
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2. Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trials~~ 
that Respondent is capable of producing sufficient income to meet 
her needs. In support of this argument, Appellant states on page 
5 of his brief that on the basis of Respondent's salary during 
the first quarter of 1977, her taxable income was $20,400.00. 
Appellant then questions the reliability of testimony given by 
the accountant that the gift shop is not capable of paying Respond:: 
a salary of $20,400.00 annually based upon the income of the gift 
shop for the first three months of 1977. Appellant concludes that 
the gift shop's loss of $1,700.00 for the first quarter of 1977 
is not unusual; that the gift shop is a "healthy" business and 
that the record shows Respondent's income to be $20,400.00 per 
annum or $1,700.00 per month (See, Appellant's Brief, p. 6). 
Respondent disputes the conclusions reached by Appellant 
regarding the testimony given by the Accountant, Mr. Ericksen. 
In the first place, the accountant testified that the Respondl 
salary from the gift shop in the calendar year 1976 was $11, 200.0~. 
(Tr. 13) The Accountant further testified that the Respondent 
received additional cash in the amount of approximately $9,300.00 
during 1976 and that the source of those funds was a draw on the 
Respondent's partnership equity representing a decrease therein 
plus a loss in the business during the year 1976 (Tr. 13, 14). 
It can hardly be argued that a salary plus a decrease in partne~ 
ship equity and a business loss for the year 1976 can be equated 
to a salary payable from the business to the Respondent as argued 
by the Appellant. Apparently the Trial Court chose to believe 
-8-
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the testimony of Mr. Ericksen as it entered its finding that 
Plaintiff's salary was in fact $11,200.00 for that year (R. 89). 
During the first three months of 1977, the Respondent received 
a gross salary of $5,100.00 or $1,700.00 per month, which the 
accountant concluded the business could not continue to pay for 
the full twelve month period of 1977. (Tr. 15) In fact, it is 
interesting to note that at the 1976 salary rate of $11,200.00 
per year, the business lost money, i.e. $290.00 (Tr. 14) Based 
upon that evidence, the Respondent submits the Appellant seriously 
mischaracterizes the economic picture of the gift shop in stating 
that "this is a picture of a healthy business partnership whose 
increasing earnings are being distributed, at least in Respondent's 
case, in the form of a higher salary" (See Brief of Appellant, p. 
6). It is difficult to imagine that a small business in which 
the first quarter shows a loss of $1,700.00 (Tr. 16) and the 
previous year reflected a loss of $290.00 can in any way be 
regarded as "healthy" . 
A more reasonable explanation for Respondent's high first 
quarter income for 1977 lies in the fact that the business is 
owned by Respondent and her parents. And further, that Respondent's 
mother works in the business without salary. (Tr. 17, R. 89 t8). 
The evidence was clear that during the period of April, 1975 
to April 1976 the Appellant did not earn any income nor contribute 
to the support of the Respondent and the parties' family (Tr. 
23). Fortunately, during that period the parents of the parties' 
were able to provide some assistance and support (Tr. 23) and of 
course, the Respondent provided the balance from income generated 
-9-
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from the business. 
It is certainly not the purpose of alimony to provide support 
and maintenance for a party only after depletion of that party's 
resources and that party's family's resources. Respondent should 
not be required to live from the proceeds of loans from her 
parents, particularly during a period of time when the Appellant, 
a trained thoracic surgeon, was able to provide for the support 
and maintenance of his wife of over twenty years and their minor 
children where the evidence is as clear as it is in this case 
that Appellant's income is more than adequate to pay the alimony 
and child support awarded to the Respondent by the Trial Court. 
It is therefore clear that Appellant misstates the evidence 
presented when he claims that Respondent has an income adequate 
to meet her needs without the payment of alimony. Instead, the 
evidence presented amply supports findings of the Trial Court in 
making its award. Respondent's expenses on a monthly basis 
exceed the sum of $2,300.00 per month without any repayment of 
loans to Respondent's parents required by her to be paid in the 
Decree of Divorce in connection with the Respondent's business 
(R. 37 1112), including a loan from her parents in the sum of 
$15, 000. 00 (Tr. 7). 
3. Appellant argues that the evidence does not support an 
award of $350. 00 per month per child as child support. Appellant 
does not support this argument by reference to the evidence, to 
any exhibit, by citation to the record or otherwise (See, Appella;:I 
Brief, pp. 9, 10). 
A review of the evidence presented does, in fact, support 
the award of child support at the amount indicated and the Trial 
-10-
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Judge, after a consideration of the testimony and all relevant 
factors, so found. The evidence at the trial was abundantly 
clear that Respondent's expenses included items for housing, 
food, clothing, transportation, etc., a substantial portion of 
which is obviously required for the support and maintenance of 
the two children in Respondent's custody. (Ex. 1-P) 
The Appellant somehow suggests that the case of Anderson v. 
Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946) implies that the trial 
court here confused the purpose of alimony and the purpose of 
child support and thereby granted Respondent a "hidden award of 
alimony" in what Appellant considers excessively high child 
support. In fact, in the Anderson case, there was a variance 
between the findings and the decree with respect to alimony and 
child support. The Respondent submits that Anderson is totally 
inapplicable to the instant case in that the trial judge here 
made specific findings and conclusions with respect to both 
alimony and child support (R. 91, ~/2). The Anderson court noted 
that the criterion for the determination of support money is the 
need of the persons supported and the Defendant's ability to pay. 
Id. at 135-136. The trial court in this case found both a need 
on the part of the minor children and that the Appellant in fact 
had the ability to pay. 
B. The Trial court did not misunderstand or misapply the 
law so as to create substantial prejudicial error. 
Appellant argues that in deriving the amount of the alimony 
award the Trial Court applied criteria inconsistent with criteria 
recommended by the Utah Supreme Court. Appellant suggests that 
-11-
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the Trial Court's consideration of 
.. among other things, (1) the length of 
the marriage, (2) Plaintiff's assistance to 
Defendant during the lean years from June, 1955 ~ 
1970 and during which Defendant prepared himself 
for his present profession of cardiovascular 
surgery and particularly, (3) the present dispu~ 
in the Plaintiff's and Defendant's income and the· 
disparity in their income potential. 
indicates that the Court did not base the award upon the correct 
criteria which the Appellant argues is the financial condition 
and need of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a suff~~ 
income for herself and the ability of the husband to provide 
support (See, Appellant's Brief p. 4). 
1. Appellant is not justified in accusing the Trial Court 
of applying incorrect criteria. In its reference to the "prese~ 
disparity" in the Plaintiff's and Defendant's income and the 
disparity in their income potential, the Court does base the 
award on the ability of the Respondent to support herself and the' 
ability of the Appellant to provide support. Obviously, when one 
has a low income potential, one has a limited ability to support 
oneself, whereas, when one has a high income potential, one may 
have the ability to provide support for another, and in this 
case, the obligation to provide such support. In that connection, 
it should be noted that in April of 1976, the first month the 
Appellant reopened his medical practice in California, his rece~t: 
were $100.00. His receipts in May were $384.00, and those receipt: 
increased per month to the point that in December of 1976, Appella: 
receipts after fee adjustments totalled $9,325.18. (Exhibit 2-
P). In January of 1977, Appellant's receipts exceeded $5,800.00 
(Exhibit 4-P); in February, $5,200.00 (Exhibit 5-P) and in 
March, Appellant's receipts exceeded $9,400.00 (Exhibit 6-P). 
-12-
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Based upon such earnings, it can hardly be argued with convincing 
force that the Appellant does not have the ability to support his 
former wife and two minor children. In view of such overwhelming 
evidence, it is clear that the trial Court demonstrated in its 
award that it knew and applied the criteria recommended and urged 
by the Appellant and supported by numerous decisions of this 
Court. 
This Court recently considered "economic disparity" in the 
income potential of divorced parties and noted in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 
569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977), the following: 
Notwithstanding all of the talk of equal rights 
for women, the trial court would be justified in 
taking cognizance of the commonly known fact that 
in many fields of endeavor there is an unfavorable 
disparity between the economic potential for women 
as compared to men. For whatever reason, there is 
in fact quite a wide difference between the economic 
status of these parties. 569 P.2d 1104, 1106. 
Contrary to the argument advanced by Appellant that the 
trial Court confused the standard appropriate to the division of 
assets with the standards appropriate to awarding alimony as 
proscribed in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the trial 
Court in fact followed the instructions and standards set forth 
in the cases cited in English _2/ in that the amount of alimony 
to be awarded is measured by the needs and requirements of the 
wife, considering her station in life, and upon the husband's 
ability to pay. In Mitchell, the situation presented to this 
Court was a situation where, for one year the parties' income 
Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971); Hendricks 
v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 559, 63 P.2d 277 (1936). 
-13-
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increased substantially and significantly and the trial court 
there apparently did not consider either the Plaintiff's actual 
- or potential earning ability, the effect of certain potential 
rental income, nor the Defendant's historical earning situation 
(noting that the Defendant's income in the previous year was 
fifty percent (50%) less) and that he had experienced unusual 
prosperity during the one year which the trial court used in 
basing its award. Clearly, those factors are not present in the 
instant case. 
Here, the Appellant was able, during his first year of the 
resumption of his medical practice, to earn on an accrual basis 
in excess of $83,000.00 and on a cash received basis, in excess 
of $64,000.00 (R. 89, •• 5, 6). While the Respondent's income, 
without alimony, child support or a reduction in the equity of 
her business was $11,200.00. (R. 89 •Bl. 
Even if this Court finds that the Trial Court misunderstood 
or even misapplied the law, which Respondent denies, such a 
defect would not result in substantial prejudicial error to the 
Appellant. The award made by the Trial Court is equitable under 
any test. The evidence clearly substantiates the findings of the 
Trial Court that Respondent has a need for alimony; Respondent 
does not have the ability to produce a sufficient income for 
herself and the minor children of the parties; and the Appellant 
is able to provide the alimony and support awarded. 
C. No serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. 
Under Utah law, when deciding questions concerning an award 
of alimony or child support, the trial court has considerable 
-14-
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latitude of discretion. The findings of the Trial Court should 
not be modified unless as made and entered they work such an 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion, 
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). Since the Court's 
findings are substantiated by the evidence and there is no injustice 
in the award, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent respectfully requests 
that the Order and Judgment of the Trial Court be affirmed and 
further that the Respondent be awarded her attorney's fees in 
defense of this appeal and Respondent's costs. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of January, 1978, 
~-
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
12th Floor, 310 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondent 
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